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The Court has chosen certainty in the law at the expense of flexibility.
This result was reached with the full realization that, although Topco's
horizontal territorial restriction agreement reduced competition among
95 "
the Topco members, it actually enhanced competition with the big chains.
The Court believed that its decision was mandated by precedent and,
therefore, established a per se rule. However, such a rule does not
simultaneously elaborate "a doctrine which is at once rooted in sound
social policy, internally consistent, and able to cope comfortably with the
problems for which the law is expected to supply solutions."9 6 As was
noted by the district court:
There has been a marked concentration of economic resources
and retail outlets among a few of the most powerful national and
large regional food chains, while independent 97
grocers and smaller
chains have disappeared at an accelerating rate.
It is highly probable that the Topco decision will serve as a springboard
for even greater acceleration in the abolition of independent grocers and
small food chains. In any event, the Topco decision will not serve to retard
the pace of concentration in the large national and regional food chains.
A. Roy DeCaro
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Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co. (U.S. 1972)
Petitioner, the State of Hawaii, charged respondents with violating
the Sherman Act' and filed a complaint 2 praying for monetary and inhave; nor does it attempt to show that those practices "lack . . . any redeeming virtue."
405 U.S. at 622 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
95. 405 U.S. at 620 n.9 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
96. Bork, supra note 15, at 776.
97. 319 F. Supp. at 1034.
1. The Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1 & 2 (1970), was allegedly violated by
the respondents in the following ways: (1) entering into unlawful contracts; (2)
conspiring and combining to restrain trade and commerce in the sale, marketing, and
distribution of refined petroleum products; and (3) attempting to monopolize and
actually monopolizing trade and commerce. Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co., 405 U.S.
251, 253 (1972).
The respondents included Standard Oil of California, Union Oil of California,
Shell Oil, and Chevron Asphalt Company.
2. Hawaii filed its initial complaint on April 1, 1968, and thereafter amended
it four times. Id.
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junctive relief pursuant to sections 43 and 164 of the Clayton Act. The
state sought recovery in three distinct capacities: (1) in its proprietary
capacity ;5 (2) as parens patriae,6 alleging damages to the general economy 7
as distinct from individual consumer injuries; and (3) as representative
plaintiff in a class action on behalf of all consumers. The district court
dismissed the class action as "unmanageable," but denied respondents'
motion to dismiss the parens patriae count.9 However, the federal district
court certified1 ° the parens patriae count to the United States Court of
3. Section 4 of the Clayton Act provides:
Any person who shall be injured in his business or property by reason of
anything forbidden in the antitrust laws may sue therefor . . .without respect
to the amount in controversy and shall recover threefold the damages by him
sustained, and the cost of suit, including reasonable attorney's fees.
15 U.S.C. § 15 (1970) (emphasis added).
4. Section 16 of the Clayton Act provides in relevant part that:
Any person, firm, corporation, or association shall be entitled to sue for and
have injunctive relief .. .against threatened loss or damage by a violation of
the antitrust laws ....
15 U.S.C. § 26 (1970) (emphasis added).
5. The state, as a purchaser of petroleum products itself, had standing to sue
in that capacity for overcharges and possibly a decrease in gasoline tax revenues
under section 4. This count was never challenged by the respondents.
6. The parens patriae complaint was framed as follows:
The State of Hawaii, acting through its Attorney General, brings this action
by virtue of its duty to protect the general welfare of the State and its citizens,
acting herein as parens patriae, trustee, guardian and representative of its
citizens, to recover damages for, and secure injunctive relief against, the
violations of the antitrust laws hereinbefore alleged.
405 U.S. at 254.
7. The unlawful contracts, combination and conspiracy in restraint of trade,
unlawful combination and conspiracy to monopolize and monopolization . . .have
injured and adversely affected the economy and prosperity of the State of Hawaii
in, among others, the following ways:
(a)revenues of its citizens have been wrongfully extracted from the State
of Hawaii;
(b)taxes affecting the citizens and commercial entities have been increased
to affect such losses of revenues and income;
(c)opportunity in manufacturing, shipping and commerce have (sic) been
restricted and curtailed;
(e) the high cost of manufacture in Hawaii has precluded goods made
there from equal competitive access with those of other states to the
national market;
(g)the Hawaii economy has been held in a state of arrested development.
Id. at 255.
8. The district court, in an unreported opinion, reasoned that "under the
circumstances . . . the class action based upon the injury to every individual purchaser
of gasoline in the State .. .would be unmanageable." Id. at 256 n.5, citing Reporter's
Transcript, at 154 (1969).
9. Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co., 301 F. Supp. 982 (D. Hawaii 1969).
10. A district judge in a civil action may certify an otherwise nonappealable
order to the court of appeals if it presents a controlling question of law on which
there is substantial ground for difference of opinion. 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) (1970).
The court of appeals has discretion to accept or reject the certification.
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Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, which, exercising its discretion to hear the
case, reversed and directed that the parens patriae count be dismissed."
Viewing the question of whether a state has standing to sue as parens
patriae for damages to its general economy under section 4 of the Clayton
12
Act as one of first impression, the Supreme Court granted certiorari.
8
The Court, through Justice Marshall,' held that a state does not have
standing to maintain a claim as parens patriae under section 4 of the
Clayton Act when it alleges damages to the general economy attributable
to an alleged violation of the antitrust laws. Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co.,
405 U.S. 251 (1972).
In the course of the development of the common law, the Sovereign
retained duties and powers referred to as the "royal prerogative."' 1 He
was said to exercise these powers as parens patriae or "father of the
country." Blackstone described the Sovereign, in his role as parens patriae,
as the general guardian of infants, idiots, and lunatics, 15 and as the superintendent of all charitable uses of the realm.' 6 Most commentators have
expressed the view that these two powers, retained by the Sovereign in
his capacity as parens patriae, were all inclusive ;17 that is, these powers
did not represent broad categories of uses to which they might be put, but
rather they exhausted the scope of the power of the Sovereign in his role
as parens patriae.
In the United States, the concept of parens patriae assumed new and
more expansive dimensions as the traditional scope of the power was
widened into the broader concept of the quasi-sovereign interests8 of the
state. This expansion of the scope of the power stemmed from a series of
decisions' 0 concerning the constitutional grant of original jurisdiction to
20
the Supreme Court whenever a state is a party.
It is unfortunate that the major cases involving the concept of parens
patriae were brought directly to the Court through its original jurisdiction,
11. Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co., 431 F.2d 1282 (9th Cir. 1970). The Ninth
Circuit based its opinion on two grounds: an injury to the general economy of the
state is not an injury to its "business or property ;" and even if the general economy
can suffer damages, such an injury is indirect and therefore not compensable. See
notes 59-95 and accompanying text infra.
12. Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co., 401 U.S. 936 (1971).
13. Marshall, J.,delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Burger, C.J., and
Stewart, White, and Blackmun, JJ., joined. Douglas and Brennan, JJ., filed dissenting opinions. Powell and Rehnquist, JJ., took no part in the consideration or
decision of the case.
14. See Malina & Blechman, Parens Patriae Suits for Treble Damages under
the Antitrust Laws, 65 Nw. U.L. REV. 193, 197 (1970).
15. W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 47-48 (12th ed. E. Christian ed. 1793).
16. Id.
17. Malina & Blechman, supranote 14, at 197.
18. For purposes of continuity, the term parens patriae is used throughout this
Note.
19. See notes 21-38 and accompanying text infra.
20. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, provides in pertinent part:
In all Cases . . . in which a State shall be a Party, the Supreme Court shall
have original Jurisdiction.
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for this avenue of consideration resulted in a blending of the constitutional
requirements for original jurisdiction and the common law requirements
for a parens patriae action. Notwithstanding this problem, an analysis of
the relevant cases reveals two distinct requirements which have evolved
to form a condition precedent to every parens patriae action.
The first important case dealing directly with the concept of a parens
patriae action was Louisiana v. Texas.21 Texas had passed a quarantine
law to prevent the spread of infectious disease into Texas from the cargoes
and crews of Louisiana shippers. Louisiana argued that the law was being
administered so as to place an embargo on Louisiana shipping and sued
for injunctive relief in its capacity as parens patriae. The Court denied
original jurisdiction and, in so doing, delineated the first requirement of a
parens patriae action:
[I]t must appear that the controversy to be determined is a controversy arising directly between the State of Louisiana and the State of
Texas, and not a controversy in the vindication of grievances of
22
particular individuals.
Although the right to invoke the Court's original jurisdiction was
denied in Louisiana, that case established the validity of a parens patriae
action which was much broader than the traditional common law concept
of the Sovereign as parens patriae.23 The broadened dimension of parens
patriae was emphasized seven years after Louisiana in Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co.2 4 Georgia sought to enjoin the defendant, a Tennessee
corporation, from discharging noxious gas from its plant in Tennessee,
the fumes therefrom being carried by the wind into Georgia, and from
causing wholesale destruction of forests, orchards, and crops. The Court
allowed the parens patriae action to proceed:
This is a suit by a State for an injury to it in its capacity as quasisovereign [parens patriae]. In that capacity the State has an interest
independent of and behind the titles of its citizens in all the earth
25
and air within its domain.
Clearly, then, parens patriae was established as a viable theory upon
which the state could predicate an action. Arguably, the Georgia case
could be read narrowly as permitting a parens patriae action only in cases
where the state interest was obvious, such as in protection of its natural
resources, boundaries, or other areas in which it had a logically paramount
interest. 26 Such a reading, however, would be incorrect. In New York
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.

176 U.S. 1 (1900).
Id. at 16 (emphasis added).
See text accompanying notes 14-17 supra.
206 U.S. 230 (1907).
Id. at 237 (emphasis added).
Malina & Blechman, supra note 14, at 206.
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v. New Jersey2 7 North Dakota v. Minnesota,28 and Pennsylvania v. West
Virginia,29 the Court made it clear that parens patriae actions encompassed but were not limited to the state's vindication of disputes involving
only natural resources or boundaries. Therefore, the initial requirement
of a parens patriae action became apparent - the state interest must
transcend the interest of the individual citizen; that is, the action by the
state must be more than a mere assertion of the claims of its individual
citizens.30 This requirement was further emphasized by New Hampshire
v. Louisiana,31 in which a parens patriae action was denied. In New
Hampshire, involving an obvious factual ruse to circumvent the eleventh
amendment, 32 the Court held:

[O]ne State cannot create a controversy with another State . . .
by assuming the prosecution of debts owing by the other State to
33
its citizens.
27. 256 U.S. 296 (1921).

New York sought to enjoin New Jersey from

discharging sewage into the upper New York Bay. Along with an allegation of
damage to the water, New York alleged that the discharge was offensive and
injurious to persons living nearby, that it interfered with bathing, swimming,
and fishing, and that it was a contaminant of marine life. The Court, holding that
New York could maintain the suit, stated:
The health, comfort and prosperity of the people of the State and the value of
their property being gravely menaced . . . the State is the proper party to
represent and defend such rights ....
Id. at 301-02.
28. 263 U.S. 365 (1923). North Dakota sought to enjoin Minnesota from
continuing to use a system of drainage ditches and sought to recover money damages
for the injury to North Dakota farmers caused by river overflows atttributed to
the ditches. The Court remarked:
The right of a State as parens patriae to bring suit to protect the general
comfort, health, or property rights of its inhabitants threatened by the proposed
or continual action of another State . . . is to be differentiated from its
[the plaintiff-state] lost power as sovereign to present and enforce individual
claims of its citizens as their trustee against a sister state.
Id. at 375-76. The traditional power of a sovereign state to present and enforce
claims of its subjects has its roots deep in feudal law. See generally Comment,
Armed Reprisals During Intermediacy - A New Framework For Analysis of
International Law, 17 VILL. L. REV. 270, 273 (1971).
29. 262 U.S. 553 (1923). Pennsylvania sought to enjoin West Virginia from
enforcing a legislative act which required West Virginia drillers of natural gas to
keep all gas found in West Virginia within that state. The Court observed:
Their [Pennsylvania consumers] health, comfort and welfare are seriously
jeopardized by the threatened withdrawal of natural gas from the interstate
system. This is a matter of grave public concern in which the State . . . has
an interest apart from the individuals affected.
Id. at 592 (emphasis added).
30. This requirement has been criticized. See Comment, Wrongs Without
Remedy: The Concept of Parens Patriae Suits for Treble Damages Under the
Antitrust Laws, 43 S. CAL. L. REv. 570, 590 (1970).
However, this requirement seems to be the only correct analysis in view
of the eleventh amendment which provides:
The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to
any suit . . . commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by
Citizens of another State.
U.S. CONST. amend. XI. Therefore, if the state were merely asserting claims of
individual citizens against a sister state, it would exalt form over substance to allow
the suit.
31. 108 U.S. 76 (1883).
32. New Hampshire sued Louisiana to collect on assigned coupon bonds which
had become due. A New Hampshire statute allowed an individual holder of defaulted
coupons to assign them to the state for collection. Id. at 77-78.
33. Id. at 91. Accord, Kansas v. United States, 204 U.S. 331 (1907). See note
30 supra.
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The second requirement which must be met in order to institute a
parens patriae action was initially alluded to in Missouri v. Illinois. 4
There, Missouri sought to enjoin a corporation, chartered by Illinois, from
dumping sewage into the Mississippi River, thereby allegedly causing a
nuisance to all Missouri citizens. The Court permitted the suit to proceed, stating:
[Ilt must surely be conceded that, if the health and comfort of the
inhabitants of a State are threatened, the State is the proper party
to represent and defend them.35
The Missouri decision implied that a substantial number of state residents
be adversely affected by the alleged wrongful acts of the defendant in order
to maintain a parens patriae action. Arguably, the Missouri holding is
sufficiently ambiguous to be limited in scope to citizens along the Mississippi
River, and therefore, it could be an application of the first requirement the transcendence of the state interest beyond the interests of individual
citizens. That this reading is improper, however, was demonstrated subsequently by Kansas v. Colorado."6 Kansas sought the original jurisdiction of the Court to restrain Colorado from diverting water from the
Arkansas River to be used for irrigation in Colorado. Although Kansas
did not succeed on the merits, 3 7 the Court granted jurisdiction, holding:

[T]he mere fact that a State had no pecuniary interest in the controversy, would not defeat original jurisdiction of this court, which
might be invoked by the State as parens patriae, trustee, guardian or
representative of all or a considerable portion of its citizens .... 38
In the instant case, Hawaii encountered no difficulty meeting the
second requirement of a parens patriae action. It was not disputed that a
substantial number of Hawaiians were injured through the alleged violations of the antitrust laws. Therefore, the first requirement - the need
to show that the state interest stood apart from the claims of individual
citizens - became the focal point of the litigation. In order to meet this requirement, Hawaii found it necessary to allege damages to the state's gen40
eral economy,3 9 which raised a potential conflict with the antitrust laws.
No case before 1945 had dealt with the right of a state to sue as
parens patriaeunder the antitrust laws. 41 Then, however, in a five-to-four
34. 180 U.S. 208 (1901).

35. Id. at 241 (emphasis added). Missouri explicitly recognized, however, that
questions of boundary rights or of direct property rights belonging to the state were
not at issue. Id.
36. 206 U.S. 46 (1907).
37. The Court determined that there was an equal displacement of benefit and
of burden, and therefore both states had rights to the water. Id. at 117.
38. Id. at 99 (emphasis added). Note that this wording was used by Hawaii in
its fourth amended complaint. See note 6 supra.
39. See note 7 supra.
40. See notes 3 & 4 supra.
41. Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447 (1923), held that a state could not
sue as parens patriae to protect its citizens from the operation of a federal statute.
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decision, the Court decided Georgia v. Pennsylvania Railroad.42 Georgia
sought the original jurisdiction of the Court and charged twenty railroads
with a conspiracy in restraint of trade, alleging that, by fixing arbitrary
and noncompetitive rates to and from Georgia so as to prefer other states,
the railroads effectively limited commerce between the states. Georgia
sued in two capacities: first, in its capacity as a proprietor to redress the
wrongs suffered in its ownership of a railroad ;43 second, in its capacity as
parens patriae, alleging damages to its general economy and seeking treble
damages under section 444 of the Clayton Act and injunctive relief under
section 1641 of the Clayton Act.

In its request that the complaint be dismissed for not presenting a
justiciable issue, the railroad raised arguments similar to those raised by
the defendants in the instant case. First, the railroad argued that Georgia
lacked standing to sue under the antitrust laws, except in its proprietary
capacity. 46 The Court, construing section 4 liberally and, with Justice
Douglas as its spokesman, stated:
[W]e find no indication that, when Congress fashioned those civil
remedies, it restricted the States to suits to protect their proprietary
interests. Suits by a State, parens patriae, have long been recognized.
There is no apparent reason
why those suits should be excluded
47
from . . . the anti-trust acts.

The railroad further argued that Georgia was merely asserting the claims
of individual citizens and was therefore not suing as parens patriae. The
Court rejected this argument:
This is a suit in which Georgia asserts claims arising out of federal
law and the gravamen 48of which runs far beyond the claim of damages
to individual shippers.
Although section 4 provides for recovery of damages for a violation of the
antitrust laws, Georgia could not recover due to prior approval of the
challenged rates by the Interstate Commerce Commission. 49 Nevertheless,
Justice Douglas, intent on giving section 4 a broad scope, moved headlong
However, the Court did not reach the question of a suit for damages under a statute
similar to the Clayton Act.
42. 324 U.S. 439 (1945).
43. The Court disposed of this claim by treating it merely as a "makeweight." Id.
at 450.
44. See note 3 supra.
45. See note 4 supra.
46. It should be noted that, at the outset, the Court had to decide that a
state is a "person" within the meaning of the Clayton Act in order for the state
to have standing to sue in any capacity. 324 U.S. at 452.
47. Id. at 447.
48. Id. at 452.
49. Approval of the challenged rates barred a damage recovery on the ground
that Georgia would have an unfair economic advantage over shippers of other
states. Keough v. Chicago & N.W. Ry., 260 U.S. 156 (1922).
Justice Douglas, in his dissent in Hawaii, called this a "technicality irrelevant
to the present case." 405 U.S. at 269 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
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into the issue of recovery of damages for injury to the economy. Feeling
that the general economy of a state could suffer injury severable from the
injuries to individual citizens, he stated:
If the allegations . . . are taken as true, the economy of Georgia and
the welfare of her citizens have seriously suffered as the result of this
alleged conspiracy. Discriminatory rates are but one form of trade
barriers .

. .

. Georgia as a representative of the public is complain-

ing of a wrong which, if proven, limits the opportunities of her people,
shackles her industries, retards her development, and relegates her
to an inferior economic position among her sister States. These are
matters of grave public concern in which Georgia has an interest
apart from that of particular individuals who may be affected. Georgia's
interest is not remote; it is immediate.50
Although this is strong dicta, the issue of recovery of damages was not
properly before the Court, 51 and, concretely, Georgia stands only for the
proposition that a state, as parens patriae, may sue for an injunction
under section 16 of the Clayton Act. 52 Georgia represented the last word
of the Court on this matter until the instant case.
In order to recover damages for violation of the antitrust laws, the
state, even if pursuing a valid parens patriae claim, must conform to the
additional requirements of section 4 of the Clayton Act. Section 4 is a
reenactment of section 7 of the Sherman Act, which provided that a
"person" could sue for treble damages if he was injured in his "business"
or "property" due to a violation of the antitrust laws. Although the injunctive provision of the Act, section 16, 53 was not at issue in Hawaii,
it should be noted that this section does not contain the "business" or
"property" restriction on standing.54
It can be argued that the issue of recovery of damages by a state for
injury to its general economy was settled in Georgia,5 and Hawaii did,
in fact, assert that Georgia was authority on which to grant the state
standing as parens patriaeunder section 4.56 However, the Court declined
to follow the dicta in Georgia and construed that decision narrowly,
limiting it to its precise holding r7 The initial inquiry in the instant case
50. 324 U.S. at 450-51 (dicta) (emphasis added).
51. In the instance case, however, Justice Douglas maintained that the discussion
of the damage issue in Georgia was not an idle gesture, and thus Georgia was
dispositive of the case. 405 U.S. at 268-69 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
52. It is odd indeed that there should be any argument as to whether a state
may sue as parens patriae for an injunction after Georgia. Yet, the majority in
Hawaii suggested that the state might not have standing to do so. Id. at 261.
53. See note 4 supra.

54. See note 71 infra.
55. See notes 42-49 and accompanying text supra. See also 405 U.S. at 266, 270
(Douglas & Brennan, JJ., dissenting).

56. See Proceedings, Arguments Before the Court: ParensPatriae and Antitrust,

40 U.S.L.W. 3189 (1971).
57. 405 U.S. at 260. The Court remarked that: "[n]owhere in Georgia did
the Court address itself to the question whether § 4 of the Clayton Act authorizes
damages for an injury to the general economy of a state." Id. Apparently, Justice
Marshall simply meant that the issue of damaves was not properly before the
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was, therefore, whether an injury to the general economy was an "injury"
58
to the "business" or "property" of a state.
It is significant to note that the terms "business" or "property" are
neither defined in the statute5 9 nor discussed in the legislative history. 60
They have, therefore, been a nemesis to the courts which heretofore sought
to define them. At the very least, the disjunctive position of the two words
indicates that they are to be treated as different concepts, and, in general,
61
the courts have favored a rigid construction.
In dealing with the concept of "business," evidence of an ongoing
business is not necessary, but there must, at least, be a showing of an intention to enter business combined with a preparedness to do so. 62 The
most concise definition of "business" was set forth in Roseland v. Phister
Manufacturing Co. :68
[T]he word business

. . .

signifies ordinarily that which habitually

busies, or engages, time, attention or labor, as a principal serious concern or interest. In a somewhat more truly economic, legal and
industrial sense, it includes that which occupies the time, attention,
and labor of men for the purpose of livelihood or profit, - persistent
human efforts which have for their end pecuniary reward.6 4
The Hawaii Court declined to expand the meaning of "business" and opted
for the strict definition developed by the lower federal courts65 as exemplified by Roseland.
The concept of "property" in this context is even more elusive. 66
"Property" in ordinary connotation has a broader meaning than "business." As was stated in Waldron v. British Petroleum :67
The word "property" is, in a sense, a conclusory term, i.e., an interest
which the law protects. A determination whether plaintiff has "property" involves a value judgment as to whether that which plaintiff
factually possesses should be legally protected. 68
Confining itself to these strict - albeit traditional - definitions, the
Hawaii Court, without analysis, simply concluded that standing could not
Georgia Court, and therefore, the dictum in that case (see notes 47 & 50 and
accompanying text supra) was irrelevant to the instant case.

.58. Id. at 264-65.
59. Clayton Act § 4, 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1970). See note 3 supra.
60. 405 U.S. at 264-65.
61. See notes 62-68 and accompanying text infra.
62. Martin v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 365 F.2d 629, 633 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
385 U.S. 991 (1966) ; American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 166 F. 261 (2d Cir.
1908), aff'd, 213 U.S. 347 (1909) ; Delaware Valley Marine Supply Co. v. American
Tobacco Co., 184 F. Supp. 440 (E.D. Pa. 1960), aff'd, 297 F.2d 199 (3d Cir. 1961).
63. 125 F.2d 417 (7th Cir. 1942).
64. Id. at 419. See Jack v. Armour & Co., 291 F. 751 (8th Cir. 1923) ; Broadcasters, Inc. v. Morristown Broadcasting Corp., 185 F. Supp. 641 (D.N.J. 1960).
65. 405 U.S. at 264.
66. Hamman v. United States, 267 F. Supp. 420 (D. Mont. 1967), appeal
dismissed, 399 F.2d 673 (9th Cir. 1968).
67. 231 F. Supp. 72 (S.D.N.Y. 1964).
68. Id. at 86.
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be granted to Hawaii to sue for damages under section 4 because its general
economy was not part of its "commercial interests or enterprises.," 69
It is important to note that, even if the general economy of a state
could be considered its "business" or "property," the issue of severability of
damages might still prevent recovery; that is, if the economy were not
severable, then the state would, in fact, be suing to redress individual
claims and thus would not meet the first requirement of the parens patriae
concept.70 Therefore, the question, in the instant case, narrowed to whether
the allegedly damaged economy of Hawaii was severable from the aggregate
of individual damages sustained by Hawaiian consumers.
The Court recognized that the problem of severability was vitiated
under section 16 because 100 injunctions are no more deleterious to the
defendant than one injunction. 71 However, when the relief sought is damages, the aspect of recovery for injury to the general economy, considered
together with the threat of future private antitrust actions against the same
defendant by individual consumers, raises the spectre of potential double
recovery. 72 The Court summarily dealt with this issue of double recovery
and injury to the economy:
A large and ultimately indeterminable part of the injury to the "general
economy" as it is measured by economists is no more than a reflection
of injury to the "business or property"
of consumers, for which' they
7
recover themselves under § 4. 3
Thus, the majority of the Court subscribed to the theory that damage
to the economy is simply an aggregation of individual consumer damages
and limited Hawaii's standing to a suit in its proprietary capacity.7 4 Justice
Douglas disagreed, stating that "growth, progress, and development are
more than symbols .

.

. they represent the goal which planners .

.

. estab-

69. The majority stated:
When the State seeks damages for injuries to its commercial interests, it may
sue under § 4. But, where as here, the State seeks damages for other injuries,
it is not properly within the Clayton Act.
405 U.S. at 264.
Justice Brennan felt that the property of Hawaii was diminished by the
additional tax revenue it was denied due to a decrease in the sales of gasoline. Thus,
the harm was to the economic welfare of the state as a whole and was an injury
to the property of the state which was compensable under section 4 of the Clayton
Act. Id. at 273 (Brennan, J., dissenting). See Chattanooga Foundry v. Atlanta,
203 U.S. 390 (1906). However, this approach merely begs the question of whether
the demand for gasoline within the state is elastic; that is, there is no demonstrable
evidence that an increase in gasoline prices leads to a decrease in gasoline sales and,
hence, a decrease in gasoline tax due the state. See notes 80-86 and accompanying
text infra.
70. See notes 21-33 and accompanying text supra.
71. 405 U.S. at 261. The parties were in agreement that, whether or not
Hawaii could sue for injunctive relief as parens patriae, it was of no practical consequence since it could be granted the same relief in its proprietary capacity. Standard
Oil, nevertheless, expressed doubt as to whether Hawaii could sue as parens patriae
for injunctive relief. See Proceedings, supra note 56, at 3190.
72. 405 U.S. at 261-62.
73. Id. at 264.
74. See note 69 and accompanying text supra.
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lish and seek to attain. '75 Alabama, in an amicus curiae brief, also disagreed,
asserting that "a state's economy is susceptible of articulation and measurement."' 76 Interestingly, neither of the foregoing positions was supported
by a single authority. 77 Thus, it would seem that both sides of the dispute
seized on what, to them, was obvious and, therefore, was without need of
detailed proof.
There are, primarily, two economic positions 78 which have been
advanced and which, at least theoretically,79 support the assertion that a
state's economy is severable from the aggregate of individual damages.
The first is the monopoly-profit theory s° which is founded on the belief
that as businesses monopolize, growth of the economy is retarded because
the economy is deprived of the money that would have been spent for
labor, rent, and interest in a competitive situation. Thus, as competition
decreases, small businesses are forced out of existence, and the general
economy suffers due to loss of the stimulus which, in a competitive system,
money would provide. It is submitted, however, that this theory does not
adequately demonstrate that the aggregate of damages to individuals is
necessarily different from the resultant injury to the economy because it is
simply a theory utilized to formulate the deleterious effects of monopolization and is not a theory of severability of damages.8 '
The second theory involves the "multiplier effect."'8 2 Under this
approach, a microeconomic s model is used to trace the effect of an injury
75. 405 U.S. at 268 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
76. Id. at 269.
77. Justice Douglas alluded to KuZNETs, ECONOMIC GROWTH OF NATIONS 346-47
(1971).
Although this treatise dealt with economic growth on a national level,
Justice Douglas, nevertheless, reasoned by analogy that the sovereign state, as a
unit of the nation, is important in modern economic growth and, therefore, must
have a measurable economy of its own. 405 U.S. at 268. However, this conclusion
does not follow without a much more complicated and detailed analysis. See notes
78-86 and accompanying text infra.
78. Compare Note, State Protection of Its Economy and Environment: Parens
Patriae Suits for Damages, 6 COLUM. J.L. & Soc. PROB. 441 (1970), wherein the
author argued that a state can prove damages, by relevant economic data, to its
economy as severable from the aggregate of individual injury, with KUZNETS, supra
note 77.
79. It should be noted that the Hawaii Court had little patience with economic
theory as distinct from economic practicality and opted for the latter to the exclusion
of the former. See 405 U.S. at 263 n.14, citing Hanover Shoe, Inc. v. United Shoe
Mach. Corp., 392 U.S. 481, 489 (1968).
80. For a concise explanation, see Hearings on S. 2512 Before the Subcomm.
on Antitrust and Monopoly of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 89th Cong., 2d
Sess. 76, 81 (1967) (testimony of John D. Guilfoil). See also A. SMITH, WEALTH OF
NATIONS

573 (rev. ed. 1863).

81. To hold that the theory demonstrated severability would be to "ignore the
real economic world" and prefer instead "an economist's hypothetical model." Hanover Shoe, Inc. v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 392 U.S. 481, 493 (1968).
82. The "multiplier" concept usually refers to the increase or decrease in large
scale investment or government expenditure. The higher the marginal propensity
to consume, the larger the total expenditure and the "multiplier." See generally
KEISER, ECONOMICS: ANALYSIS AND POLICY 238-41 (1965).
83. Microeconomics denotes an economic analysis applied to small groups of
individuals or to the individual himself. It is to be distinguished from a macroeconomic analysis which focuses on the whole economic system - state, nation, or
world - and on the interplay therein.
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on an individual consumer to its resultant effect on business.8 4 This effect
on business, in turn, sends ripples - beneficial or harmful - throughout
the economy.8 5 The result in an injurious situation is a slump in growth
and a retardation of progress, indicated generally by a recession in varying
degrees. In the logical abstract, this theory is easily understood. But
it is extremely difficult to apply to the actual, ever-changing economy of a
state, and therefore, it is not a proper vehicle to demonstrate severability
of the economy from individual damages. It is submitted that neither
theory sufficiently establishes that the general economy is distinct from an
aggregation of individual injuries suffered by consumers or businesses.
In order to demonstrate this point, it would be necessary to separate each
state into an individual economic unit86 - a task requiring Herculean effort.
Justice Marshall expressed his concern with such prospects:
Even the most lengthy and expensive trial could not, in the final
anaylsis, cope with the problem of double recovery inherent in allowing damages for harm both to the economic interests of individuals
and for the quasi-sovereign interests of the state. 87
Therefore, recognizing the inherent difficulties in demonstrating severability as well as the threat of double recovery, the Court limited the State
of Hawaii to suits in its proprietary capacity. Furthermore, realizing that
it was on uncertain ground, the Court asserted that, if damage to the
economy was compensable under section 4, it was up to Congress to provide
88
such a remedy by an amendment to the Act.
84. This effect is analogous to the "accelerator principle" which suggests that
investment increases or decreases with output and that, as demand for finished goods
increases, demand for capital goods also increases. Therefore, for each unit of consumer goods, there will be X units or negative X units of capital goods, concommitant with a decrease in demand. See KEISER, supra note 82, at 241-44.
85. The microeconomic analysis would run as follows: (1) A, a consumer,
spends $50 more than necessary due to price-fixing in petroleum products and $10
more in taxes because the state is also a consumer; (2) A is forced to forego
spending that $60 on consumer goods for a given period; (3) due to decreased
demand, businesses normally patronized by A decrease sales; (4) this, in turn, leads
to decreased orders for manufacturers and suppliers; and (5) manufacturers and
suppliers, faced with decreased orders, decrease production. In other words, as the
marginal propensity to consume decreases, demand decreases; hence output and
expenditures for capital goods must also decrease, but at an accelerated pace.
Although A's contribution to the loss is infinitesimal, when multipled by
the 800,000 consumers in Hawaii, the resultant loss to the economy is staggering.
It should also be noted that the decreased output and demand accelerate once
they begin, and thus, the multiplier increases and the loss to the state's economy
theoretically is many times that of the aggregate of individual injuries. See note
84 supra.
86. For the number of variables that enter into such a calculation, see KEISER,
supra note 82, at 243-44. Moreover, these theories are usually applied on a national
level, and to apply them on a state level, one would have to separate Hawaii from
every other state and somehow apportion general economic injury pro rata to the
complaining state. That is, not every supplier and manufacturer who was forced
to forego units of capital output because of decreased demand was based in Hawaii.
Hence, these theories may apply on a national level, but are of dubious value on
the state level.
87. 405 U.S. at 264.
88. Id.
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In addition to requiring an injury to "business" or "property," section
4 has been interpreted as also requiring that the injury be direct. Therefore, "only those at whom the [antitrust] violation is directly aimed, or
who have been directly harmed may recover [treble damages] ."s9 Thus,
it has been held that damages to shareholders, 90 creditors, 91 officers, 92 and
landlords, 93 grounded upon antitrust violations, are not direct. It would
seem, therefore, that damages to the economy, if not severable from damages to individual consumers, are not direct.9 4 While the initial loss to
the consumer would be direct, the aggregation which comprises the economic injury sued for by the state as parens patriae would be indirect.
Moreover, it is significant to note that price-fixing by oil companies is,
by definition, aimed at consumers or at the state as proprietor, and it is
in this context that the injury would be direct.95
Even assuming arguendo that the state could have shown a direct
injury to its economy and that the economy was part of the "business" or
"property" of the state, Hawaii would still have been confronted with the
problem of proof of damages. However, while the injury to "business"
or "property" must be direct and not remote, proof of damages in an antitrust action is somewhat less demanding. The applicable standard was
enunciated in Story Parchment v. Paterson Parchment Paper Co.,96 where
it was held:
[W]hile damages may not be determined by mere speculation or
guess, it will be enough if the evidence show [sic] the extent of the
damages as a matter of just and reasonable inference although the
result be only approximate.9 7
Even in light of this standard, it is submitted that Hawaii could not have
successfully withstood the sanction against speculation and conjecture in
establishing damages. There seems to be no "just and reasonable" method
of computing the potential value of the businesses which left Hawaii, those
which did not locate there, the reduction in consumer spending, or the
loss in the tourist trade.98 The number of indeterminable variables in89. Productive Invention, Inc. v. Trico Prods. Corp., 224 F.2d 678, 679 (2d Cir.
1955) (emphasis added).
90. Loeb v. Eastman Kodak Co., 183 F. 704, 709 (3d Cir. 1910).
91. Id.

92. Corey v. Boston Ice Co., 207 F. 465 (D. Mass. 1913).
93. Harrison v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 211 F,2d 405 (3d Cir. 1954), cert.
denied, 348 U.S. 828 (1955). Accord, Melrose Realty Co. v. Loew's, Inc., 234 F.2d
518 (3d Cir. 1956).
94. See Proceedings, supra note 56, at 3140.
95. Id.

96. 282 U.S. 555 (1931). The rationale behind this standard is that a denial
of all relief to plaintiff would relieve the wrongdoer of making amends for his act,
simply because plaintiff was unable to prove with certainty the extent of the harm.
Thus, there is a fundamental distinction between injury and damages, the former
presenting a more formidable hurdle than the latter.
97. Id. at 563 (emphasis added). For an interesting application of this standard,
see Richfield Oil Corp. v. Karseal Corp., 271 F.2d 709 (9th Cir. 1959).
98. It can be argued that the trial stage, and not the pleadings stage, is the
more appropriate time to decide this issue. 301 F. Supp. at 988. Justice Brennan
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herent in such a calculation is staggering. Moreover, there are other
serious problems in proving damages. Such cases immerse the courts in
theoretical litigation in which they lack the economic expertise to operate.
Secondly, ascertaining damages of this type is simply beyond the ken of the
ordinary jury, and thus it is unlikely that the jury could cope with the matter
competently. Lastly, the potential individual plaintiff would be squarely
faced with the prospect of proving that his claim was not compensated
should the state emerge victorious.
The last point relied upon by the Court in concluding that Hawaii
had no standing as parens patriae under section 4 was the least convincing.
The Court reasoned that, since section 4A 99 of the Clayton Act, which
extends standing to the United States to sue for violation of the antitrust
laws, does not allow the United States to sue in its capacity as parens
patriae, "the conclusion is nearly inescapable that § 4, which uses identical
language, does not authorize recovery for economic injuries to the sovereign interests of a State."' 100 It is submitted that this analogy is unacceptable since sections 4 and 4A are independent provisions having entirely
separate purposes. The former was enacted to encourage private suits,
while the latter was passed for the narrow purpose of extending standing
to the United States to sue for antitrust violations in a limited capacity
in view of the availability of other highly effective means of enforcing
the antitrust laws. 10' Thus, a similarity in the language of the two sections
is largely meaningless, not only in light of the different purposes for which
each was enacted, 102 but also in light of the different resources and
remedies available to the United States vis-A-vis the states.
Every antitrust violation is a blow to the competitive system on
which this country operates. This system, dependent upon active competition for its health and vigor, necessarily must also rely upon compliance
with the antitrust laws. 10 3 Congress chose to encourage private individual
litigants by enabling them to recover three times the amount of their
also maintained this position. 405 U.S. at 274 n.* (Brennan, J.,
dissenting). However,
with damages so remote and based upon so speculative an area as the economy,
there seems to be no basis on which to go to trial. But see Note, supra note 78
99. This section provides in pertinent part:
Whenever the United States is hereafter injured in its biusiness or property
by reason of anything forbidden in the antitrust laws it may sue therefor .. .
without respect to the amount in controversy, and shall recover actual damages
by it sustained and the cost of suit.
Clayton Act § 4A, 15 U.S.C. § 15a (1970) (emphasis added).
100. 405 U.S. at 265.
101. "The United States is, of course, amply equipped with the criminal and
civil process with which to enforce the antitrust laws." S. REP. No. 619, 84th Cong.,
1st Sess. 3 (1955). Clearly, the individual consumer or even the state does not
possess the power which the United States has at its disposal to punish antitrust
violations. This is true in terms of the number of qualified persons in the employ
of the United States, the amount of time they can devote to pursuing violators,
and the amount of money the United States has at its disposal for such a purpose.
102. 405 U.S. at 275-76 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting).
103. For a discussion of nonsanctioned monopolistic practices and the effects
against which the antitrust laws guard, see KEISER, supra note 82, at 599-610.
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